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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN K. PROVENCE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981353-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant, John K. Provence, appeals his conviction of operating a clandestine drug 
laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1996), and 
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was trial counsel ineffective by not objecting to a jury instruction that properly 
reflected the preliminary hearing court's bindover ruling? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on 
appeal, this Court resolves the issue as a matter of law. State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 
(UtahApp. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 3, 1996, defendant John K. Provence was charged by information with 
operating a clandestine drug laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1996) (R. 001), and possession of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1996) (R. 003). 
At a preliminary hearing held on November 29, 1996, the State adduced evidence 
that defendant possessed certain laboratory equipment and supplies used in the production 
of methamphetamine (R. 215:2-11, 18-21). Through the testimony of an investigating 
officer, the State showed that defendant kept iodine, scales, and other items used in the 
production of methamphetamine in his bedroom (R. 215:15-16,18-19, 23-24). The State 
also showed that defendant possessed methamphetamine which was found in his kitchen 
(R. 215:9, 11). From the quantity of evidence discovered inside defendant's house that 
indicated the operation of a clandestine drug laboratory, one investigating officer opined 
2 
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that defendant had been manufacturing methamphetamine (R. 215:36). At the conclusion 
of the preliminary hearing, the preliminary hearing court1 stayed its bindover decision 
pending further review (R. 215:66-68). 
On December 3, 1996, the preliminary hearing court orally announced its decision 
to bind the case over on both charges (R. 215:69-70). Specifically, as to the charge of 
operating a clandestine drug laboratory, the court ruled that: 
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable 
cause. Very limited probable cause, and very limited bindover 
in this case. On Count 1, it's a first degree felony, Violation 
of Clandestine Drug Lab Act. I find there is probable cause 
only on the following elements to bind the case over for trial. 
That the Defendant possessed supplies, laboratory supplies, 
specifically iodine, with intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation. I'm finding that on the basis that he 
knew that it was ongoing, and apparently knew that the iodine 
would be used in that process. And therefore in a liberal 
interpretation of that would be participating in that. And that 
the lab operation was for the production of methamphetamine. 
And that was the evidence in the case. 
As far as the remaining elements, I don't think the State 
can rely on any of the other elements. I'm not binding it over 
on any of the others.2 And it's on that limited finding. 
(R. 215:69-70). 
1
 In this case, the same district court judge acted as both preliminary hearing court 
judge and trial court judge. However, for the sake of clarity, the two courts will be 
referred to herein as separate entities. 
2
 The preliminary hearing court did not bindover on the element that the operation of 
the laboratory occurred within five-hundred feet of a residence, as charged in the information 
(R. 215:62). The court apparently questioned the applicability of that particular element in 
this instance (R. 215:61 -62). However, because that element was charged in the alternative, 
this did not affect the bindover of the charge as a first degree felony. 
3 
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On February 5 and 6, 1997, defendant was tried on both charges. During the trial, 
the trial court expressed some confusion over the elements underlying the bindover 
(R. 184:210). Specifically, the trial court was concerned that the docket entry 
memorializing the preliminary hearing court's December 3, 1996, bindover decision did 
not accurately reflect the court's oral announcement thereof (R. 184:212). That docket 
entry stated: 
DECISION: AS TO COUNT 1, COURT ORDERS DEF 
BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL. COURT FINDS THERE IS A 
LIMITED AMOUNT OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND 
CASE OVER. COURT FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE ON 
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: 1) DEF POSSESSED 
SUPPLIES (LABORATORY SUPPLIES, I.E. IODINE) 
WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN CLANDESTINE LAB 
OPERATION. 2) DEF KNEW IT WAS ONGOING, AND 
NEW [sic] THE IODINE WOULD BE USED FOR THAT 
PROCESS. COURT DOES NOT BIND CASE OVER ON 
REMAINDER OF ELEMENTS AS TO COUNT 1. AS TO 
COUNT II, COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS HEARSAY 
E V I D E N C E D E F P O S S E S S E D T H E 
METHAMPHETAMINE. COURT WILL ORDER COUNT 
II BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL ALSO. 
The trial court recognized that deficiencies must exist in the docket entry, otherwise the 
case could not have been bound over as a first degree felony (R. 184:214). The court 
remedied this problem by referring to the recording of the oral bindover decision, in which 
the preliminary hearing court found that the clandestine drug laboratory operation was for 
the production of methamphetamine (R. 184:213, 223). The case proceeded as charged, 
with the operating a clandestine drug laboratory charge being tried as a first degree felony. 
4 
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Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged on both counts 
(R. 158-59). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
five-years-to-life on the operating a clandestine drug laboratory charge and a concurrent 
zero-to-five year term on the possession of methamphetamine charge (R. 186:10). 
This appeal ensued (R. 179). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 3,1996, defendant operated a clandestine drug laboratory and possessed 
methamphetamine. The following facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. See State v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350. 351 (Utah 1996). 
Between 6:50 and 7:00 a.m. on August 3,1996, Officer Timothy Shelstead arrived 
at defendant's home, having been dispatched to investigate a house fire that "had a 
chemical smell to it" (R. 184:84; 87). As Officer Shelstead arrived, paramedics were 
loading defendant's friend, Ronald Ray Olsen, into an ambulance that had previously 
arrived on the scene (R. 184:85). Olsen suffered extreme burns throughout his body from 
the house fire (R. 184:85). Olsen later died from his injuries (R. 185:142). 
Officer Shelstead made contact with defendant and his wife, who identified 
themselves as renters of the smoldering house and Olsen as a resident in their basement 
(R. 184:85). Both defendant and his wife initially claimed to have no knowledge of what 
had occurred; they stated that they were awakened by Olsen's screams and then discovered 
that their home was on fire (R. 184:86). 
5 
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As Officer Shelstead approached the house, he overheard two firemen discussing 
the discovery of numerous beakers and suspicious items in the basement (R. 184:87). 
Concerned that a clandestine drug laboratory had been operating in the home and had 
caused the fire, Officer Shelstead inquired of the defendant whether Olsen had been 
operating a methamphetamine laboratory in the basement (R. 184:87). Defendant replied 
that he had heard rumors that Olsen had been making methamphetamine (R. 184:87). 
Defendant also admitted that he and his spouse both used drugs and that there was 
methamphetamine in his kitchen (R. 184:88). Based on the evidence available to Officer 
Shelstead, he read defendant his Miranda rights and arrested him (R. 184:89). 
Officer Shelstead then asked defendant whether he smelted anything in his home 
that would indicate that Olsen had been cooking methamphetamine in the basement 
(R. 184:91). Defendant replied that "you could have five police officers walk in the room 
next to the room that basically someone is cooking meth in, if it was done right, with the 
door shut, and you'd never smell it" (R. 184:91-92). Also, defendant reported that Olsen 
had been cooking methamphetamine in the basement for three to four weeks (R. 184:95). 
When Officer Shelstead inquired as to defendant's participation in the production of 
methamphetamine, defendant admitted that he purchased iodine, a component of 
methamphetamine, for Olsen (R. 184:95). 
After obtaining a search warrant, Officer Shelstead entered defendant's bedroom 
and found several items indicative of drug activity (R. 184:96). Officer Shelstead found 
6 
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a set of scales, some small plastic baggies containing a powdery substance which proved 
to be methamphetamine, some pipes, beakers, cash, a shotgun, a pistol, notebooks 
apparently chronicling drug transactions, a spiral notebook diagraming the proper 
construction of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, and a locked box 
(R. 184:96-97; 153; 185:25). The locked box contained iodine crystals and red 
phosphorus, both of which are methamphetamine precursors (R. 184:101). Defendant 
later disclaimed ownership of the scales and the iodine (R. 184:99, 101). 
Officers found evidence relating to the use and manufacture of drugs throughout 
defendant's house. In the kitchen, they found an encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs 
(R. 184:151). In the basement, officers found several items of glassware used in the 
production of methamphetamine (R. 184:175-76), a small cooking stove (R. 184:177), 
several chemical precursors to methamphetamine (R. 184:177-78; 183-186), protective 
equipment (R. 184:184), and other evidence related to the operation of a clandestine drug 
laboratory (R. 184:113;187-88). 
At trial, defendant admitted to using methamphetamine, but denied having 
purchased equipment or chemicals for Olsen to produce methamphetamine (R. 185:90, 
103-04). Also, defendant claimed to have only heard rumors that Olsen was producing 
methamphetamine in the basement, but did not know for sure that a clandestine drug 
laboratory existed in his own house (R. 185:109-110). 
7 
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The jury found defendant guilty of both operating a clandestine drug laboratory and 
possession of methamphetamine (R. 185:151). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting 
to a jury instruction that allegedly conflicted with the preliminary hearing court's bindover 
ruling. However, in so arguing, defendant misconstrues the bindover decision. The 
preliminary hearing court properly bound defendant over under all of the elements 
necessary to convict under Utah Code. Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 & -5 (1996), and the elements 
that the court bound over for trial were properly reflected in the jury instructions. 
Accordingly, defendant's conviction is entitled to affirmance on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE BY 
FAILING TO OBJECT TO A JURY INSTRUCTION 
THAT PROPERLY REFLECTED THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING COURTS BINDOVER DECISION. 
The analytical framework for determining whether a defendant was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The complaining defendant must first show that counsel's performance "fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness." IcL. at 688. To do so is a heavy burden and a 
defendant must overcome "'a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 
8 
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(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689). "'This court will not second-
guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choices appear in 
retrospect. *" Strain. 885 P.2d at 814 (quoting State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,465 (Utah 
App. 1993)). Additionally, defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
prejudicial by proffering sufficient evidence demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Although this Court need not address both elements of the Strickland test if 
defendant makes an insufficient showing as to one of them, Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 
516, 523 (Utah), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994), neither element is satisfied here. 
First, counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness 
because the jury instruction at issue, jury instruction no. 26, accurately reflected the 
bindover decision of the preliminary hearing court. That instruction stated: 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
Violation of Clandestine Drug Lab Act, a first degree felony, 
you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
all of the following elements of that crime: 
1) That on or about August 3, 1996, said 
defendant, John K. Provence; 
2) knowingly or intentionally possessed 
laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to 
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation and 
3) the intended clandestine laboratory operation 
was for the production of methamphetamine base; 
4) and said offense occurred in Weber County, 
State of Utah. 
9 
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If you believe that the evidence established each and all 
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence failed to establish one or more of said 
elements, you should find the defendant not guilty. 
(R. 156). 
According to defendant, this instruction conflicted with the bindover decision as 
reflected by a December 3, 1996, docket entry. Specifically, defendant avers that the 
preliminary hearing court never bound defendant over as to the third element, that the 
clandestine drug laboratory operation was for the production of methamphetamine base. 
Aplee. Brief at 14, 15. The docket entry upon which defendant bases his argument reads: 
DECISION: AS TO COUNT 1, COURT ORDERS DEF 
BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL. COURT FINDS THERE IS A 
LIMITED AMOUNT OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND 
CASE OVER. COURT FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE ON 
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: 1) DEF POSSESSED 
SUPPLIES (LABORATORY SUPPLIES, I.E. IODINE) 
WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN CLANDESTINE LAB 
OPERATION. 2) DEF KNEW IT WAS ONGOING, AND 
NEW [sic] THE IODINE WOULD BE USED FOR THAT 
PROCESS. COURT DOES NOT BIND CASE OVER ON 
REMAINDER OF ELEMENTS AS TO COUNT 1. AS TO 
COUNT II, COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS HEARSAY 
E V I D E N C E D E F P O S S E S S E D T H E 
METHAMPHETAMINE. COURT WILL ORDER COUNT 
II BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL ALSO. 
10 
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However, the record in this case clearly indicates that this docket entry is 
inaccurate. In the transcript of the preliminary hearing court's oral announcement of its 
bindover decision, the court found the following concerning the charge of operating a 
clandestine drug laboratory: 
I find there is probable cause only on the following elements 
to bind the case over for trial. That the Defendant possessed 
supplies, laboratory supplies, specifically iodine, with intent to 
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. I'm finding that 
on the basis that he knew that it was ongoing, and apparently 
knew that the iodine would be used in that process. And 
therefore in a liberal interpretation of that would be 
participating in that. And that the lab operation was for the 
production of methamphetamine. And that was the evidence 
in the case. 
(R. 215:69-70) (emphasis added). 
At trial, the trial court initially experienced the same confusion that defendant 
exhibits on appeal, displaying uncertainty as to the elements that were bound over for trial 
(R. 184:213,223). However, after referring to the tape of the oral decision, the trial court 
was sufficiently satisfied to permit the operating a clandestine drug laboratory charge to 
be tried as a first degree felony. Furthermore, the elements set forth in the preliminary 
hearing court's bindover decision were subsequently incorporated into jury instruction 
no. 26. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Because the jury instruction precisely stated the elements bound over for trial, 
a failure to object to the instruction cannot fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for not raising meritless claims. 
See State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1993) (rejecting ineffectiveness of counsel 
claims that are not only "unsupported by the record, but also [are] contradicted"); Cf State 
v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988) (finding no ineffective assistance for not 
requesting improper jury instructions). 
Additionally, jury instruction no. 26 accurately reflects the elements of the first 
degree felony of operating a clandestine drug laboratory; therefore, defendant cannot 
establish prejudice as a result of trial counsel*s failure to object. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37d-5 (1996) states: 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), or (e)3 is 
guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the 
following conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1996) provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
12 
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(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous 
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials 
in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was created 
a substantial risk to human health or safety or danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take 
place within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or 
school; 
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation involved 
a person less than 18 years of age; 
(f) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any 
amount of a specified controlled substance; or 
(g) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the 
production of cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed 
in Subsections (l)(a) through (g) of this section occurred in conjunction of 
the violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be 
suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of 
offense. 
Id. (emphasis added). The elements set forth in section 58-37d-5 were not only accurately 
reflected in both the preliminary hearing court's bindover decision and jury instruction 
no. 26, but these elements were also proven by the State at trial. Thus, defendant cannot 
establish prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object to jury instruction no. 26. 
Accordingly, defendant's ineffectiveness of counsel claim does not meet either prong of 
the Strickland analysis. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Pl_ day of November, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
£Et 
NO&MAN E. PLATE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed by first class mail this ^  day of November, 1998, to the following: 
RANDINE SALERNO 
WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASS'N 
2568 Washington Blvd, Suite 102 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Counsel for Appellant 
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SECOND JUDICIv 
ATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
HN K.. PROVENCE 
Defendant. 
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TRICT COURT OF WEBER COU- STATE OF UTAH 
0SSTR1CT COURT 
WESSR COUNTY 
AMENDED 
iNFg^iog
 Rn 10 25 
Attorney No 96-1212F 
District No 961900776 
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ate of Utah 
unty of Weber ss 
Count I 
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the 
ttplainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant on or about 
ra day of August, 1996 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
RST DEGREE FELONY, TO WIT: 
DLATION OF CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT, 58-37d-5, U.C.A. (1953), AS 
ENDED, AS FOLLOWS: 
FENDANT POSSESSED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECUSSOR WITH 
TENT TO ENGAGE IN A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY OPERATION OR 
SSESSED LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES WITH THE INTENT TO 
SAGE IN A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY OPERATION AND 
ID LABORATORY OPERATION TOOK PLACE WITHIN 500 FEET OF A RESIDENCE 
E INTENDED CLANDESTINE LABORATORY OPERATION WAS FOR THE 
DDUCTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE. 
is information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
SHELSTEAD 
VANORDEN 
ZIMMERMAN 
ascribed in my presence this 06th da\ 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
IA, 
2y 
MARK R. DeCAR
County Attorne
TT. S 
September, 1996 
MAGISTRATE 
ssented and filed this 06th day of September, 1996 
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SECOND JUDICi;.- DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COIL.,,*, STATE OF UTAH 
ATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
HN K. PROVENCE 
Defendant 
B -- 55/08/21 
INFORMATION 
Attorney No 96-1212F 
O.T.N. 8032682 
ate of Utah 
unty of Weber ss 
Count I 
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the 
mplainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant on or about 
ra day of August, 1996 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
COND DEGREE FLEONY, TO-WIT: 
ODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 58-37-8, U.C.A., (1953) AS 
ENDED, AS FOLLOWS: 
ID DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY PRODUCED, MANUFACTURED, 
SPENSED OR POSSESSED WITH INTENT TO PRODUCE, MANUFACTURE OR 
SPENSE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, TO-WIT: METHAMPHETAMINE, 
HEDULE II. 
ds information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
SHELSTEAD 
VANORDEN 
ZIMMERMAN Authorized for presentment and filing: 
MARK R. DeCARIA, 
County Attorney 
lbscribed in my presence this 05th day^af August ,1996 
d£y^ 
MUJMft 
MAGISTRATE 
resented and filed this 05th day of August , 1996 
CLERK 
yViJv^w^_ 
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SECOND JUDICIA._ DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COD.. Y, STATE OF UTAH 
'ATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
i > • 
>HN K. PROVENCE 
Defendant. 
)B -- 55/08/21 
INFORMATION 
Attorney No 96-1213F 
O.T.N. 8032682 
:ate of Utah 
mnty of Weber ss. 
Count II 
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the )mplainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant on or about 
*ra day of August, 1996 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
IIRD DEGREE FELONY, TO-WIT: 
)SSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 58-37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953) 
3 AMENDED, AS FOLLOWS: 
\ID DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY POSSESSED OR USED A 
5NTROLLED SUBSTANCE, TO-WIT: METHAMPHETAMINE, SCHEDULE II 
lis information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses 
. SHELSTEAD 
. VANORDEN 
. ZIMMERMAN 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
MARK R. DeCARIA, 
County Attorney 
abscribed in my presence this 05th da 
MAGISTRATE 
resented and filed this 05th day of August ,/£996 \ 
mi CLERK f 
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ADDENDUM B 
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INSTRUCTION NO. <r^f> 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Violation of Clandestine Drug Lab 
Act, a first degree felony, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1) That on or about August 3, 1996, said defendant, John K. Provence; 
2) knowingly or intentionally possessed laboratory equipment or supplies with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation and 
3) the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
methamphetamine base; 
4) and said offense occurred in Weber County, State of Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the essential elements of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the 
defendant not guilty. 
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